Where we
actually are.
Most companies publish a roadmap. Fewer publish the gaps. If Warden is going to ask a fire service to trust a record it can't see inside, the least we can do is state plainly what is built, what isn't, and what is still wrong. Everything below is checkable, and some of it is uncomfortable.
Warden's entire proposition is that a record should be verifiable rather than taken on trust. That principle is worthless if the company describing itself gets a free pass. So this page is written to the same standard as the verification page: no green ticks that haven't been earned.
01 At a glance
02 Live system feed
The heartbeat — or, right now, the honest silence.
Public cryptographic events only; incident and flight records are not public and never appear here. More about this feed →
03 What is genuinely built
Working code, not slideware — and you can inspect most of it.
Done The governance layer
Role-based command console, human-in-command authorisation gate, append-only event ledger with database triggers that reject UPDATE and DELETE, a seal guard that refuses to reopen a closed incident, and a governed purge that signs its own deletion onto the record.
Done Independent verification
Keyless SHA-256 chaining plus Ed25519 signatures, so a third party can verify a record with a published public key and no secret. Two verifier scripts are downloadable and readable.
Done The data-protection groundwork
A pre-reasoned Art 35 DPIA starter, a lawful-basis position, a no-facial-recognition red line and a live-only-by-default posture — all published rather than promised.
Done Ingestion that is genuinely one-way
Video and telemetry in; no command path out. Warden cannot arm, steer or land an aircraft, so it adds nothing to an operator's airworthiness case.
04 What is wrong or missing
The list we would rather you heard from us.
05 What happens next, in order
Sequenced by what blocks what — not by what is most fun to build.
Next Infrastructure & entity
Register the UK limited company with a founder IP assignment; stand up the London region; deploy the asymmetric ledger and the anchoring job. This closes three of the five gaps above.
Then A design partner
One brigade, under a free memorandum of understanding: co-author the DPIA, run one governed test flight, and produce the first real sealed record. What that involves →
Then Independent assurance
Cyber Essentials, a penetration test against the deployed system, and professional indemnity cover — the things that let a public body run supplier due diligence without stopping.
Later Procurement readiness
Article 28 processing agreement, a published commercial model, and a route to market a brigade can actually buy through.
06 Holding us to this
A status page nobody checks is just marketing with worse formatting.
If something here is out of date, wrong, or reads as more flattering than the evidence supports, tell us and we will correct it. The technical claims are the ones to test first: the verification tooling is published precisely so you do not have to believe this page.