The heartbeat,
or the honest silence.
This is the public event stream of Warden's signed ledger: key and anchor events, read from tables anyone may read in Warden's database (hosted by Supabase in Ireland, eu-west-1), as they are written. When nothing is being written it says so, rather than filling the screen with something that looks like activity. The first anchor was made on 1 November 2026, so the events here are the signing-key registration and the latest anchors, then each new one as it is written. An anchor is attempted once a day, at 03:10 Coordinated Universal Time (UTC); on a day when that attempt fails, the scheduled run writes no anchor, so none appears here.
01 What appears here — and what deliberately doesn't
A public feed of a system that handles emergency imagery has to be careful about what it publishes.
Shown Cryptographic governance events
Key issuance and chain anchoring — the events that let a third party check the record. They come from tables that are world-readable by design, so anyone can see when a key is issued or an anchor is published. The signing key is live, and the first anchor was made on 1 November 2026. The latest anchors, up to ten, appear here when the page loads, then each new one as it is written. Each row shows a shortened digest and its sink type. An anchor row is not proof on its own: check its time-stamp token with openssl, as the verification page explains.
Never shown Incidents, flights, imagery
Operational records are readable only by authenticated, role-gated users. A public stream of fire-service activity would be a privacy failure, so incident and flight events cannot appear here — not because the feed is incomplete, but because the access model forbids it.
In synthetic demo stream mode you will see flight-type events, so you can judge the interface. Every one is tagged SIM and generated in your own browser.
02 The three states
All three are honest outcomes. None of them is a placeholder.
03 Don't take the feed's word for it
A live-looking feed is easy to fake; that is precisely why it is not the evidence. The evidence is the published algorithm, the signing key's fingerprint fixed on the verification page and the verification tools, which let you check an export of the record yourself, offline, without trusting us. The anchors add when: events up to the latest time-stamped anchor (one whose token verifies) cannot be altered undetected after that anchor's RFC 3161 time-stamp. Events newer than the latest anchor are not covered until the next one, and this feed proves none of it: the checks on the verification page do.